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This “system of systems” approach contrasts with the “stove-pipe” solutions of the past 
in which individual systems were designed to meet specific requirements, but with much 
less thought about how they would interact in the overall force.  The “stove-pipe” 
approach has worked well enough in the past because the self-contained requirements 
were more important than how well a platform could interact with other platforms.  But 
as we move further in the digital age where information superiority and speed of action 
are such key enablers of the force, it has become increasingly critical to tie the entire 
force together.  The Army has gambled that the best way to do this is to design the future 
force holistically, fielding a sum that is greater than its parts.  However, the enormity of 
the task was not originally apparent to its designers.  This fact is becoming increasingly 
clear to Congress as the Army has been forced to increase funding requests and extend 
timelines several times.  In reaction, Congress is considering a number of actions 
including the cancellation of the program.  This paper examines the status of the FCS 
program and provides several recommendations on how the FCS program office could 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is the U.S. Army’s ambitious attempt 
to modernize its forces in a systematic way so that everything interoperates properly.  
FCS delivers multiple integrated systems consisting of Manned Ground Vehicles, 
Unmanned Ground Vehicles, Unmanned Air Vehicles, Sensors, and a Network designed 
to seamlessly tie all these new platforms and capabilities together into one modern 
fighting force that, together, will yield a sum (in terms of combat capability) much 
greater than its individual parts.  In theory, this is the way to go.  But as with many recent 
large Department of Defense programs, the task has ended up being much more 
complicated than originally estimated, resulting in cost and schedule overruns.  As a 
result, the Army has been facing enormous pressure from Congress to cancel or 
restructure the FCS program.   
Since the program’s inception, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have dramatically 
changed the playing field:  Today’s fight against irregular forces in urban environments is 
completely different than fighting a conventional engagement and makes some question 
the urgency of developing the weapons and systems of the “future.”  In addition, the idea 
of using a commercial contractor to oversee government development – the Lead 
Systems Integrator (LSI) concept – has fallen out of vogue.  Many lawmakers now see 
the LSI concept as leaving the “fox in charge of the henhouse.”  In the face of these 
pressures, the Army has stayed flexible, trying to meet the demands of many of its 
detractors by making multiple changes to the program.  But we believe that this formula 
may be insufficient and puts this entire groundbreaking program at risk.   
Army leadership is starting to appear as the proverbial Dutch boy with too few 
fingers to stop all the leaks that are emerging.  By trying to respond to the many pressures 
and do so without raising their cost estimates, the Army is beginning to lose its 
credibility.  Some specific recent actions by the Army include: 
• Planning to deploy equipment (the Non-Line of Sight [NLOS] cannon) before 
it is ready so that it can appease some of its detractors 
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• Reducing the number of platforms from 18 to 14 so that it can control 
spiraling costs  
• Keeping their cost estimate for the program pinned at $161 Billion, even 
though estimates from independent groups (the Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group [CAIG] and the Institute for Defense Analysis [IDA]) show costs 
growing to as high as $300 Billion  
• Acknowledging that its own estimate for the number of required software 
lines of code has grown by 50 percent, but then insisting that costs will not 
grow 
These actions smack of desperation and send the message to Congress that, rather 
than managing the program in a pro-active and upfront manner, the Army has chosen to 
defend their current course of action regardless of mounting evidence or pressures. 
We therefore conclude that it is time for the Army to conduct a major program 
restructuring in order to protect the concept of a long-term modernization program that 
can steer the development and integration of new systems into the Army. 
In particular, we recommend that the Army create a Future Combat Systems 
Integration (FCSI) office.  This Army-managed and staffed office would be charged with 
planning for the integration of new systems into the panoply of Army systems.  This 
office would replace the current FCS management structure and, in particular, the LSI.   
Rather than trying to plan everything we need or want in a single stroke of genius, 
as was attempted in 2003, the FCSI office will: 
• Work on the incremental improvement of the Army by identifying the systems 
that are needed in the short-term.  The FCSI office would work with the Army 
Material Command (AMC) to ensure that these systems receive appropriate 
prioritization and funding in the POM 
• Development of individual systems would be managed by Army Project 
Managers, as it has traditionally been done.  However, the FCSI office would 
be intimately involved in the initial engineering to ensure that the system(s) 
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would fit properly into the System of Systems.  In addition, the FCSI office 
would serve as a member of the Integrated Product Team (IPT) for each new 
or evolved system, and would support test and integration efforts 
The writing is on the wall that the Army will not be able to afford to focus on both 
its needs in Iraq and Afghanistan and its long-term vision of the future as if they were 
largely separate entities.  We believe that this recommendation would help to bring these 
two views back into a single, focused vision in which the Army develops the items it 
needs now, while working to integrate each new development into this single, cohesive 
force where the interoperability of each item has been considered and planned for from 
the start by an office that is specifically charged with this function.   
  In terms of short-term priorities, we recommend that the new FCSI office: 
• Handoff responsibility for all detailed development of systems to the 
appropriate Army project managers while maintaining overall responsibility 
for setting priorities, defining requirements and planning integration.   
• Delay development of all the new FCS manned vehicles except for the NLOS 
Cannon. 
• Field the Class I UAV (a small soldier-launched UAV) as soon as practicable 
because it can assist in current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Terminate 
FCS development of the Class IV UAV.   
• Field the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) (a small soldier-operated 
robot) as soon as practicable because it can assist in current operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Delay further development of the Multi-Functional 
Utility Logistics and Equipment (MULE).    
• Continue to fund FCS network efforts.   
• Terminate development of the NLOS Launch System.   
• Continue work on Unattended Ground Systems. 
 4
We believe that these steps will keep the FCS program viable, allowing it to 
continue its long-term task of transforming the Army while integrating the program into 
the existing Army structure so that it can better leverage the programmatic expertise in 
existing Army project offices while accelerating efforts to assist our soldiers in the field 
with FCS technologies 
 5
I. INTRODUCTION 
Future Combat System (FCS) is the multiyear, multibillion-dollar program at the 
heart of the U.S. Army’s transformation efforts.  It is the Army’s major research, 
development, and acquisition program for the foreseeable future and is to consist of 14 
manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and 
information network.  FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-1 
Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.  The FCS program has been 
characterized by the Army, Congress, and the press as a high-risk venture due to the 
advanced technologies involved as well as the challenge of networking all of the FCS 
subsystems together.1   
As with many large Department of Defense (DoD) programs, FCS has both its 
problems and its detractors.  The cost for the FCS program has grown from initial 
estimates and delivery schedules have been delayed.  This has led Congress to look very 
closely at the FCS program.  The program does have some significant support in the 
Pentagon and in Congress.  But the Government Accountability Office, the 
Congressional Research Service, and the Congressional Budget Office have raised many 
serious issues about the program.  The Army still fully supports FCS, but the decisions 
that Congress makes on the program may delay or cancel the program, regardless of the 
Army’s support.  The perspective of the GAO and Congress on these issues could have 
significant implications for the future of the program, so it is critical that the Army 
carefully consider these issues in its plan.  However, it will also be evident that input 
from the many concerned parties is often conflicting or attempting to hold the FCS 
program to unreasonable standards.  In order to protect this transformational program, the 
Army has to find the middle ground between knee-jerk reactions to unfortunate 
suggestions and reactionary dismissal of all outside input.   
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This paper examines the primary issues facing the FCS program, analyzes a 
number of alternative approaches for the Army to take, and presents our 
recommendations on the best way forward.  The paper is organized as follows: 
• The background section focuses primarily on the plans of the FCS program.   
• The data section provides in-depth examination of the issues facing the FCS 
program.  These issues include cost, schedule, technology readiness, reliance 
on other programs, management approach, and relevance in the current/future 
security environments.  Each issue is examined from the perspectives of the 
various involved parties including Congress, the Department of Defense, the 
FCS Program, and individual soldiers.   
• The analysis section presents several possible alternatives for the Army to 
pursue regarding the fielding of FCS and examines the benefits of each. 
• The conclusions and recommendations section provides our recommendations 
on the steps that should be taken by the Army in order to provide the FCS 






A. FCS PROGRAM ANATOMY 
The FCS program was first conceived by then-Army Chief of Staff, General Eric 
Shinseki, as a way to enable Army units to react to overseas crises quickly and with 
overwhelming combat power.  Units with significant firepower—so-called heavy units—
can take weeks to deploy overseas.  By contrast, light units lack heavy weapons but can 
be transported quickly.  To correct those deficiencies, the Army initiated the FCS 
program to develop a new generation of combat vehicles.2   
In initiating the FCS program, the Army made a major break from traditional 
Army development practices by adopting a concept that was in vogue at the time, the use 
of a Lead System Integrator (LSI).  The LSI is a commercial interest, in this case the 
Boeing Corporation with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) as a 
principle subcontractor.  The LSI is basically charged with completing the entire effort, 
from doing the planning, concept development and engineering, to acting as the prime for 
the building and fielding all the equipment.  Under the LSI concept, Boeing and SAIC 
have assumed many of the roles that traditionally are fulfilled by the government.    
Fielding for the first full FCS Brigade is slated for fiscal year 2015, but FCS 
technology is being accelerated to the Army’s modular brigades through “Spin Outs.” 
These Spin Outs will allow Soldiers to utilize FCS equipment and technology as it 
becomes available.  Recently, the Army announced that this Spin Out 1 equipment will 
be provided to soldiers of the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) beginning in 2011.  
Spin Out 1 consists of FCS (BCT) Battle Command capability, Joint Tactical Radio 
System (JTRS), Unattended Ground Sensors, the Non Line of Sight-Launch System, the 
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), and the Class I Unmanned Air Vehicle.3   
After the fielding of the first brigade, the Army plans to equip its combat brigades 
with FCS components at a maximum rate of 1.5 brigades per year, purchasing 15 brigade 
sets of equipment as part of the first installment—or “increment”—of the FCS program.  
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Under the current schedule, equipment for the 15th brigade would be purchased in 2023, 
which would allow it to be fielded in 2025.4  
Program Overview:  The FCS program plans to deploy fourteen new systems plus the 
network.  As depicted in Figure 1, the fourteen systems consist of: eight Manned Ground 
Vehicles (MGV), two Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV), two Unmanned Aerial 




Figure 1.   FCS Core Systems 
Manned Ground Vehicles: 
The eight varieties of Manned Ground Vehicles that FCS plans to deploy are   
designed to replace basically all the vehicles in the Army’s current inventory.  The 
vehicles are to be designed using a common chassis and engine to improve logistic 
supportability.  Improved fuel efficiency is also a core goal.  Initially, the vehicles were 
all going to be designed to be transportable on an Air Force C-130, which would have 
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required that the vehicle weigh less than 20 tons. However, this constraint has since been 
relaxed to 24 tons.7  The 8 manned FCS Vehicles are depicted in Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2.   Varieties of Manned Ground Vehicles 
Mounted Combat System (MCS).  The MCS is equipped with a 120 millimeter (mm) 
gun capable of destroying targets at a range of 8 kilometers (km) and is designed to 
replace the M1A2 Abrams tank.  However, the MCS will weigh one-third as much as the 
Abrams, making it more deployable and much more fuel efficient.8  
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV):  The ICV can carry up to nine soldiers and two crew 
members and is designed to replace the Bradley fighting vehicle.  The ICV is armed with 
a 30 mm cannon that is more powerful than the Bradley’s 25mm, but weighs 25% less, 
again providing increased fuel efficiency.9  
Non-Line-Of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M):  The NLOS-M will be equipped with a 
mounted mortar capable of firing precision-guided mortar rounds.  The NLOS-M is 
actually heavier than the unit it replaces:  the M113 based mortar carrier. 10  
Non-Line-Of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C):  The NLOS-C replaces the M109 self propelled 
howitzer.  The NLOS-C will provide a faster rate of fire and faster road speeds than the 
M109.  The M109 is the oldest vehicle in the Army’s arsenal.11   
 10
The FCS program office has the following to say about NLOS-C:  “The NLOS-C 
is much different than all the other combat vehicles produced by the Army thus far.  
Advanced NLOS-C technology such as an automated loading system and improved 
accuracy through a projectile tracking system, coupled with the power of the FCS 
network and sensors, provides the NLOS-C’s two-man artillery crew with capability to 
quickly deliver highly accurate sustained fires for close support and destructive fires for 
standoff engagements.  This networked capability is important during both counter 
insurgency and conventional fights.  ‘After receiving situational awareness reports from 
the FCS network, the NLOS-C will be able to put precision fires on target in less than 
thirty seconds,’ stated Lieutenant Colonel Robert McVay, Army Product Manager for 
NLOS-C, ‘This is especially important in counter insurgency warfare as it will deprive 
the enemy of the ability to ‘shoot and scoot,’ while allowing Soldiers to put precise 
rounds into urban environments that will help reduce collateral damage.’12  
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV):  The RSV features a suite of 
advanced sensors to locate and identify enemy targets in all weather conditions, day and 
night.13  
• Command and Control Vehicle (C2V):  The C2V will provide commanders 
with the information and command and control resources needed to direct the 
battle.  It replaces the M113-based command and control vehicle. 14   
• Medical Vehicle (MedV):  The MedV is being designed to provide advanced life 
support to critically injured soldiers while they are being evacuated from the 
battlefield.  It will provide an enormous improvement in capability as compared 
to the current M113-based ambulance.15  
• Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (RMV):  The RMV is designed to transport 
repair crews around the battlefield and to recover disabled vehicles.  It replaces 
the M88A1 Recovery Vehicle.  The RMV is 60% lighter than the M88A1, which 
had to be heavier in order to haul the Abrams.  With the FCS vehicles being so 
much lighter, the recovery vehicle can also be lighter. 16  
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Unmanned Ground Vehicles: 
As depicted in Figure 3, the two varieties of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) 
that FCS plans to deploy are the: 
• Multifunctional Utility, Logistics, and Equipment (MULE), which is a 2.5 ton 
robotic vehicle that will come in two variants:  a transport version which can 
carry up to 2,400 pounds; and a countermine version, which would detect, 
mark, and defuse mines. 17    
• Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), which is a lightweight robot 
designed to be man-portable and to be able to scout ahead of the soldiers. 18  
The FCS website (fcs.army.mil) quotes a SGT Matt Sena (C Company, 2nd 
Cav, 1st Armor Division) as observing that: "In Ramadi, we could have used 
the SUGV to easily identify IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] on a squad 
or platoon level instead trying to secure the whole area for up to 4-5 hours 
waiting for EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal].  Definitely would help by 
giving you an early warning with possible IED positions and in buildings in 
hostile areas." 19 
 
Figure 3.   Unmanned FCS Ground Vehicles 
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Earlier, there was a third variety of UGV, the Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV), 
which would be a much larger scouting vehicle capable of either combat or improved 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), however, this vehicle was recently 
removed from FCS planning as part of the re-structuring of the program.   
Unmanned Aerial Systems: 
In its original plan, the Army planned to deploy four classes of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles, identified as Classes I through IV, with Class I being the smallest and to Class 
IV, the largest.  Recent changes have deferred Classes II and III.20   
The unmanned FCS Aerial System vehicles are depicted in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Unmanned FCS Aerial Vehicles 
The Class I UAV is being designed for use by an individual soldier.  Weighing in 
at less than 15 pounds, it will be man-portable and able to provide real-time intelligence 
data back to soldiers operating at the platoon level.  The Class I will be able to take off 
and land vertically, have a range of 8 km and be able to stay aloft for almost an hour.21  
The Class IV UAV is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the Class I.  
Weighing in at over 3000 pounds and requiring a team to maintain it, the Class IV UAV 
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has a ceiling of 20,000 feet, a payload of up to 700 pounds (for short range missions) and 
the capability to stay aloft for up to 8 hours (with a reduced payload).22  
Other Unmanned Ground Systems: 
As depicted in Figure 5, FCS includes two additional classes of unmanned 
systems:  Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) and the Non-Line of Sight Launch System 
(NLOS-LS).  FCS previously included the Intelligent Munitions System, but this has 
recently been broken out into its own independent program.23   
There are two basic variants of Unattended Ground Sensors:  Tactical UGS (T-
UGS) and Urban UGS (U_UGS).  T-UGS are further divided into Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance UGS (IRS-UGS) and Chemical, Biological, Radiation, 
and Nuclear UGS (CBRN-UGS).   
 
Figure 5.   Other Unmanned FCS Systems 
In each of their various forms, the UGS are designed to be set up and left behind 
to be able to report information via radio on their locality.  For instance, a field of ISR-
UGS might be used to provide situational awareness for a mountain pass that has been 
bypassed by the main force to ensure that forces can be vectored there if the enemy 
attempts to use the pass to infiltrate troops into our rear area.  CBRN-UGS can provide 
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early warning to the troops of the presence of these lethal threats.  Urban UGS can be 
utilized by soldiers to provide situational awareness on blocks and houses that have 
already been cleared so that the focus can be on what is in front of the troops while 
greatly reducing the risk from the rear.24   
As depicted in Figure 6, the NLOS-LS is basically a box containing 16 slots:  15 
individual missile canisters and a canister of electronics to control them and communicate 
with the outside world.  The intent is to set these boxes up in the area of operations to 
allow other components of the FCS force to be able to rapidly call in precision fire 
support via network communications.  Originally designed to host two different missiles, 
the Precision Attack Missile (PAM) and the Loiter and Attack Missile (LAM), the 
complement has temporarily been reduced to just the PAM.  The PAM is a 117 pound 
missile with a range of 40 km.  It includes Imaging Infrared/semi-active laser with 
automatic target recognition and terminal homing.  It is also networked so that it can be 
re-targeted in-flight.25                                                        
 
 
Figure 6.   NLOS-LS Box Containing 16 Slots 
Cost of the Army’s FCS Program. The FCS program represents by far the largest single 
investment that the Army is planning to make for the next 20 years. The research and 
development (R&D) portion of the program is scheduled to extend through 2016 and 
require a total of $21 billion from 2007 to 2016. The Army estimates that total 
procurement costs for the first 15 brigades’ worth of systems will be just over $100 
billion, which translates into an average unit procurement cost of $6.7 billion per brigade.  
With the planned purchase of 1.5 brigades per year to begin in 2015, the FCS program 
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will require $8 billion to $10 billion annually starting in that year and for as long as the 
program continues yearly purchases at that rate (see Figure 1).26   As depicted in Table 1 
and Table 2, the current cost estimate is more than twice the initial estimate.27   
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III. DATA 
The data section provides an in-depth examination of the issues facing the FCS 
program.  These issues include cost, schedule, technology readiness, reliance on other 
programs, management approach, and relevance in the current/future security 
environments.  Each issue is examined from the perspectives of the various involved 
parties including Congress, the Department of Defense, the FCS Program, and individual 
soldiers.  These perspectives are garnered from a multitude of open source documents 
including Congressional Budget Office studies, Government Accountability Office 
reports, the reports of Congressional Committees, the FCS website, and the articles of 
various news organizations.   
The data are extracted from published papers and reports by numerous sources, 
such as the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), the 
Program Manager, Future Combat System (PM FCS), the Program Executive Officer, 
Joint Tactical Radio System (PEO JTRS), and the Program Manager, Warfighter 
Information Network—Tactical (PM WIN-T). 
A. PROGRAM RISKS & CONSTRAINTS 
According to the Department of Department (DoD) and the Congress, the Future 
Combat System (FCS) program is characterized as a high-risk venture due to the 
advanced technologies involved, the aggressive system development schedule, and the 
challenge of networking numerous FCS subsystems together so that all future FCS-
equipped Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) can function in an interoperable, 
networked fashion, as intended.  Furthermore, the recent streams of federal fiscal policies 
have placed budgetary constraints on the FCS program with several consecutive annual 
budget cuts and the recent major restructuring of the program from 18 systems to 14 
systems. 28  
 18
 The Army started the FCS program in May 2003 before having defined what the 
systems were going to be required to do and how they would interact.  The Army moved 
ahead without determining whether the concept could be successfully developed with 
existing resources, i.e., without proven technologies, a stable design, and available 
funding and time.  The Army projects the FCS program will cost $160.9 billion.  Given 
its cost, scope, and technical challenges, the program is recognized as being high-risk and 
needing special oversight mandated by Congress, requiring the GAO to report annually 
on the FCS program. 29         
1. Congressional Position 
CRS and GAO have been tasked by Congress to provide independent assessments 
on the FCS program and have published numerous reports to address a variety of FCS 
program issues to include the program’s timeline, current program developmental risks 
and challenges, program management issues, and FCS relevance in the current and future 
security environments.  The following sections provide detailed Congressional positions 
on all FCS program issues, challenges, and concerns. 
a. Program Schedule Concern:   Misalignment of Key Decision 
Points with Key Knowledge Points 
The GAO was concerned that the FCS design and production maturity are 
not likely to be demonstrated until after the production decision is made. As depicted in 
Table 3, the FCS program timeline, the Critical Design Review (CDR) will be held much 
later than on other Army programs of record.  Therefore, the Army will not be building 
production-representative prototypes to test before production.  The first major test of the 
FCS networking capability will not take place until near the FCS production decision and 
much of the testing will involve simulations, technology demonstrations, experiments, 
and single-system testing.  Historically, testing is considered the most expensive during 
the production phase. GAO suggested since most of the problems that will be discovered 
during the pre-production test will not be resolved in time for the production decision, 
more testing will be required to take place in the production phase. 30   
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Table 3.   Best Practice Acquisition Approach 
Excerpted from:  Defense Acquisitions, 2009 is a Critical Juncture for the 
Army’s Future Combat Systems; United States Government Accountability 
Office, Mar 2008. 31 
The FCS Capabilities will not be demonstrated until after key decision 
points.  The three knowledge points key to a successful government acquisition are 
technology maturation, system integration and demonstration, and pre-production 
planning.  The Army will demonstrate the FCS system of systems capability after the 
FCS production decision in 2013, which precludes opportunities to change course if 
warranted by test results.  The late demonstration will increase the likelihood of costly 
discoveries and fixes late in development or during the production stage, since the 
program cost and schedule will become less forgiving than in earlier development stages.  
According to the government acquisition best practice, production-representative 
prototypes should have been demonstrated and tested prior to a low rate production 
decision.  Therefore, the issue lies in the misalignment of the program’s normal progress 
with the key events that are used to manage and make decisions.  Under the FCS 
Program, key decisions are being made well before sufficient knowledge is attained. 32 
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According to best practices recommended by the GAO, the most 
important part of the knowledge-based approach occurs at program start when product 
development begins.  At that point, a timely match of requirements and resources is 
critical to successful product development.  When a customer’s needs and developer’s 
resources are matched before a product’s development starts, it is more likely that the 
development will result in a successful product that is able to meet cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives.  When this match takes place later, after the product 
development is underway, problems will occur that can significantly increase the 
expected time and cost as well as result in performance shortfalls. 33  
b. Technology Risks:   Requirements, Designs, and Technologies 
According to the GAO, the definition, development, and demonstration of 
the capabilities will finish late in the FCS program schedule.  The Army ideally should 
have entered development in 2003 with firm requirements and mature technologies.  
Nevertheless, as depicted in Table 4, the FCS program will be challenged to meet these 
goals by the time of the Preliminary Design Review in 2009.  To make thing worse, the 
Army has only recently formed an understanding of what will be expected of the FCS 
network.  It will be years before demonstrations validate that the FCS will provide full 
System of Systems capabilities. 34    
 
Table 4.   FCS Technology Maturation 
Table excerpted from:  Defense Acquisitions, 2009 is a Critical Juncture for the Army’s Future 
Combat Systems; United States Government Accountability Office, Mar 2008.35 
 
While the Army should have had firm requirements at the outset of its 
development program, it is now facing a challenging task to complete this work by the 
2009 Preliminary Design Review, a full 6 years into the 10-year development schedule.  
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Many of the FCS requirements are almost certain to be modified as the program 
approaches these reviews.  The major FCS program restructure in 2007 that reduced the 
set of systems from 18 to 14 has resulted in requirement modifications, deferrals, and 
redistributions that affected the requirements balance among the remaining systems.  
While the program implements these adjustments, further requirements changes to the 
systems and network could be required.  The Army will continue to make design trade-
offs to accommodate space and weight restrictions, power constraints, and technical risks 
such as transport requirements for manned ground vehicles.  Furthermore, the crucial 
FCS software development is also hampered by incomplete requirements and designs for 
the information network. 36       
As depicted in Table 5, the critical technologies for FCS remain at low 
maturity level.  According to the Army’s latest technology assessment, only two out of 
the 44 critical technologies have reached a level of maturity that should have been 
demonstrated at program start, based on the best practice standard.  Even by applying the 
less rigorous Army standard, only 73 percent of the critical technologies can be 
considered mature enough to begin system development today.  Many of these critical 




Table 5.   Critical Technologies for FCS Components 
Excerpted from:  Defense Acquisitions, 2009 is a Critical Juncture for the Army’s Future Combat 
Systems; United States Government Accountability Office, Mar 2008.38 
 
Upon close examination of survivability, one finds that the FCS concept 
for survivability breaks from tradition because it involves more than just heavy armor to 
protect against impacts from enemy munitions.  Instead, FCS survivability involves a 
layered approach that consists of detecting the enemy first to avoid being fired upon.  If 
fired upon, an active protection system is used to neutralize incoming munitions before 
they hit the FCS vehicle.  Finally, the vehicles have sufficient armor to deflect those 
munitions that make it through the preceding layers.  Each of these layers depends on 
currently immature technologies to provide the aggregate survivability needed for FCS 
vehicles.  Many of these technologies intended for survivability have experienced 
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problems in development or have made little progress in maturity over the five years of 
the FCS program.  The cumulative effect of these multiple technology risks is a reduction 
in the overall survivability of FCS vehicles. 39  
c. FCS Networking and Software Challenges 
According to GAO, there are significant challenges to developing and 
demonstrating the FCS network and software, which is at the heart of the FCS concept.  
These significant challenges are owed more to the program’s complexity and immaturity 
than the software approach.  These risks include: 
• network scalability and performance,  
• immature network architecture, and  
• synchronization of FCS with the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 
and the Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) 
programs, which have significant technical challenges of their own.   
The recent estimate of the software code required for FCS network and 
platforms nearly triples the size of the original 2003 estimate, which at 95.1 million lines 
is, by far, the largest software effort for any weapon system.   Furthermore, the lines of 
code have grown as requirements have become better understood.  This is due to the 
program’s poorly-defined requirements, which is a key indicator of its immaturity.  
Although the Army insists that the software development cost will not change 
significantly, the independent cost estimates have differed sharply from the Army’s, 
particularly in the area of FCS software development.40           
Although the Lead System Integrator (LSI) implements disciplined 
software practices, the program’s immaturity and its aggressive development schedule 
have delayed requirements development at the software developer level.  For instance, 
software developers for the five major FCS software packages have complained that the 
high-level requirements provided to them were poorly defined, omitted, or late in the 
development cycle.  These poor or late requirements have forced the software developers 
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to do rework or defer functionality to future builds and created a cascading effect which 
caused other software development efforts to be delayed.41     
It is unclear when or how the Army and the Lead System Integrator (LSI) 
can demonstrate that the FCS network will work as needed, especially during the key 
program milestones.  For instance, the network requirements may not be well defined and 
the design may not be completed at the 2009 Preliminary Design Review.  The network 
demonstration for network performance and scalability is expected to be very limited 
during the milestone review later that year.  The limited user test in 2012, which is the 
first large scale FCS network demonstration, will take place at least a year after the 
Critical Design Review and only a year away from the start of FCS production.  Pushing 
this testing to late in the program poses risks on the FCS ground vehicle development, 
since the designs depend so heavily on network performance.  Finally, a full 
demonstration of the network with all of its software components will not be conducted 
until FCS production starts.42         
d. Impacts of Past Program Restructuring and Budget Cuts 
Over the past three years, Congress has cut funding on the FCS program.  
In response, the Army took two basic actions: 
• Reducing the number of platforms to be fielded from 18 to 14.  
Specifically, the Army eliminated the company (Class II) and battalion 
(Class III) level UAVs, deferred the Armed Robotic Vehicle until the 
FY2010 POM and separated the Intelligent Munitions System from the 
FCS program.   
• Reducing the production rate from 1.5 Brigades per year to one 
brigade per year.  This has resulted in a five-year delay to the 
completion of production.  Previously, the full complement of 15 FCS 
brigades would have been outfitted by 2023, but now it will not be 
completed until 2028. 
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Table 6.   Disposition of the Army’s Heavy Brigades 
Although the Army claims that it will save some $3.4 billion over the next 
six years, a question has been raised whether this restructuring compromises the full 
tactical and operational potential envisioned for FCS.  Furthermore, extending the 
procurement over a longer time period will obligate the Army to request additional funds 
in the future in order to keep the FCS production lines open longer. 43     
e. FCS Cost Estimates and Its Cost Growth   
The Army estimated in 2003 that the total cost of FCS would be $80 
Billion (in 2003 dollars).  In 2004, the Army raised this estimate to $108 Billion.  By 
April 2006, this estimate had risen to $230 Billion.  In April 2008, the Army estimated 
the cost of FCS to be $159 Billion (then year dollars).  These estimates are still below the 
independent estimate provided by the Department of Defense’s Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG), which estimated in July 2006 that the cost for FCS would 
rise to over $300 Billion.44  The estimated total annual cost for the FCS program is 
depicted in Table 7.  
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Table 7.   Estimated total Annual Cost of the FCS 
This may mean a reduction in capabilities of the FCS program and may 
also mean a reduction in the Army’s buying power on FCS.  Both the CAIG and the IDA 
estimated higher costs for FCS, primarily due to the higher costs for FCS software 
development resulting from a recent increase in estimated lines of code.  They use 
historical growth factors in the estimates based on their experiences on analysis of 
weapons systems and on the low level of knowledge attainable at the time on the FCS 
program.  This analysis is based on the fact that there is no firm foundation for a 
confident cost estimate due to the FCS program’s relative immaturity in terms of 
technology, requirements definition, and demonstration of capabilities to date.  
Nevertheless, the Army maintains that if it becomes necessary despite the program’s 
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uncertain cost estimate, the FCS scope will be further reduced by trading away 
requirements or changing the concept of operations, in order to keep costs within 
available funding levels.45           
f. Early Commitment to Production 
According to the GAO, the Army commitment to FCS production will 
come early, even though the FCS development will finish late in the program schedule.  
For example, production funding for the first spin-out of FCS technologies and the early 
version of the FCS cannon has already begun, even though the program has not even 
completed Preliminary Design Review (PDR).  Under a more traditional approach, PDR 
and Critical Design Review (CDR) would both be complete before any production money 
was spent.  Furthermore, the Army will request production funding for the core FCS 
systems beginning in February 2010, just months after the ‘go/no-go’ milestone review 
and before the stability of the design is determined at the Critical Design Review.  By the 
time the FCS enters the production decisions in 2013, a total of about $39 Billion 
(including both research and development and production funds) will already have been 
appropriated for the program.46   
Significant commitments to production will be made before FCS 
capabilities are demonstrated.  In 2004, the Army changed its acquisition strategy to field 
selected FCS technologies to current forces via Spin Outs, while the core program 
development is underway. The first spin out is being tested and evaluated in 2008 and a 
production decision is planned in 2009.  However, surrogate subsystems are used in the 
testing instead of fully developed subsystems, such as the fully functional JTRS radios or 
associated software.  The surrogate subsystems may not provide quality measurements to 
gauge system performance and may need JTRS radio redesign if they have different 
form, fit, and function than expected.47      
In response to the congressional appropriations mandate, the production 
for FCS Non Line Of Sight – Canon (NLOS-C) vehicles will begin sooner than expected.  
The Army has begun procuring long lead production items in 2008 and will deliver 6 
units per year in fiscal years 2010 through 2012.  Several key technologies will not be 
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mature for several years, and much requirements and design work remains on the manned 
ground vehicles, including the NLOS-C.  However, these early NLOS-C vehicles will be 
used as training assets for the Army Evaluation Task Force.  Building the industrial base 
early for the NLOS-C vehicle production can create a future need and pressure to sustain 
the core FCS industrial bases, even if the manned ground vehicles are not ready for 
production.  Consequently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics recently took steps to separate the NLOS-C early production from FCS 
core production, by making it a special interest program.48    
Furthermore, the early commitment to production has also complicated the 
Lead System Integrator (LSI) involvement with the Army, which has heightened the FCS 
program oversight challenges.  The April 2007 decision by the Army to contract with the 
LSI for the FCS production has made an already close relationship closer, which 
represents a change from the Army’s original rationale for using an LSI.  The LSI was 
originally intended to focus on development activities that the Army judged to be beyond 
what it could directly handle.  The Army leadership believed that by using an LSI that 
would not necessarily have to be retained for production, the Army could get the best 
effort from the contractors during the development phase while making it profitable for 
them.  However, the Army reliance on the LSI has been growing over time as well as the 
LSI’s involvement in the production phase, in which the current LSI development 
contract has extended almost two years beyond the 2013 production decision.  Most 
importantly, by committing to the LSI for early production, the Army effectively 
surrendered a key point of leverage it had held, which is open competition for source 
selection.  This decision has also created a heightened burden of oversight in that there is 
now a need to guard against additional pressure to proceed through development 
checkpoints prematurely.49               
g. FCS Lead System Integrator (LSI) Issues 
In a March 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, a 
serious concern was raised over the increasing role of FCS Lead System Integrator (LSI). 
The FCS LSI was originally contracted to help the FCS program office in leading and 
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integrating a complex and large System of Systems (SoS,) which was comprised of 
numerous developmental efforts in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) 
phase, primarily due to the lack of Army resources and capabilities to manage the 
program by themselves at the time.  To further safeguard against unethical business 
conducts, the Army has incorporated the organizational conflicts of interest clause in 
2005 to the FCS contract in order to preclude the LSI from competing for any new 
contract.  Nevertheless, the GAO has noticed that the LSI’s involvement in the 
production phase has grown.  Since the first equipped FCS brigades would not have the 
full operational capabilities, the Army believed that further involvement of LSI for future 
FCS enhancements in the production phase is necessary in order to fill the capability 
gaps.  GAO also suggested that the LSI will likely play a significant role in the 
sustainment phase, which would virtually put LSI in a permanent role throughout the 
FCS life cycle.  GAO reported that it is important for the government to achieve a greater 
degree of oversight within the program.  This is because the complex relationship that the 
LSI has created in FCS would increase the burden of oversight and pose risks for the 
Army’s ability to provide independent oversight over the long term.  For instance, the 
Army can become increasingly vested in the results of shared decisions and thus runs the 
risks of being less capable to provide oversight.  The Army’s performance may also 
affect the LSI’s ability to perform, which poses accountability problems.  Furthermore, it 
may be difficult for the Army to separate its own performance from that of the LSI when 
exercising contract award fees.50 
h. Complimentary Programs: The Program Issues and FCS 
Synchronization Challenges  
Most of the complimentary programs, necessary to the success of the 
program, have not yet fully synchronized with the FCS schedule.  They are also facing 
schedule delays, funding, and technical challenges.  Furthermore, the Army has raised 
concerns about the likelihood that the complimentary system will deliver the required 
capabilities when needed.  In some cases, the complimentary programs have been 
adversely affected by FCS demands while others are due to the lack of coordination 
between FCS and complimentary program officials.51  The Army describes the Joint 
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Tactical Radio System (JTRS) as the complimentary program to the FCS since the JTRS 
forms the backbone of the FCS Network by providing voice, video, and data 
communications to FCS ground and aerial vehicles.  The JTRS is therefore essential to 
the success of the FCS program.  One of the main issues was raised by the former 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology, Claude 
Bolton.  He was concerned that there may not be enough radio bandwidth to support the 
FCS network within the next five years, which could have a significant operational 
impact on FCS.  This is because FCS is heavily dependent on continuous, and near real-
time data from a wide range of sources for not only its combat effectiveness - but its 
survival on the battlefield.  Furthermore, the industry officials also suggested that the 
Army leadership has become addicted to video teleconferencing, which is why the Army 
is currently experiencing difficulty in keeping up with information demands.  The FCS 
program has been asked to investigate how FCS will perform if the network is degraded 
by lack of radio bandwidth availability and network failure.52          
The Air Force’s Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) 
program will provide the FCS with the space tier communications backbone that has far 
more bandwidth than current military satellites and better secured communications for 
FCS with low probability of jamming and intercepting by enemy forces.  However, the 
TSAT program is has also suffered from delays, restructuring, and cost cuts.  It seems 
unlikely that the first TSAT satellite will be launched in 2016 as planned, and the 
viability of the entire program is currently in jeopardy.  While the FCS program officials 
contend that they could make ends meet with current military and commercial satellites 
in the interim, one defense expert warns that the FCS network will be comprised of the 
less secure networking capabilities.  As FCS survivability depends so heavily on the 
network, this is troubling. 53                  
The Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) program is 
described as the Army future communications backbone in a three-tier network 
architecture which comprises of the ground links, the airborne links, and the space links 
which, someday, will also be able to leverage the Air Force TSAT satellite.  Its most 
unique capability is to provide high speed data communications to a dispersed and highly 
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mobile force.   The continuing delays in the WIN-T program has forced the Army to 
extend the Joint Network Node (JNN) program, which is a interim program that employs 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) networking technology to provide improved data 
communications to the Army in Iraq.  Although the JNN does provide many of the 
capabilities that are envisioned for WIN-T, it does not provide the mobile networking 
capability.  In March 2007, the Army notified Congress that the WIN-T program has 
exceeded its approved program baseline by more than 25 percent.  Consequently, the 
Congress passed the law to restructure the WIN-T program by merging it with the JNN in 
order to eliminate redundancy and to accelerate the fielding of WIN-T in four 
increments.54 
2. DoD & Army Position on Program Risks and Constraints 
In its pamphlet entitled “Army Assessment of Government Accountability Office 
Reports,” the Army states in its summary retort to three GAO reports (GAO-08-408, 
GAO-08-409 and GAO-08-467SP):55 
¾ Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports adequately point out risk to the 
Future Combat Systems program, but not program results.  Thus far, potential 
problems identified by GAO have not materialized.  
¾ FCS is the critical part of the Army’s modernization strategy focused on conflicts 
we face today and in the future.  The Army strategy takes a balanced approach 
dealing with the requirements of the current force and developing and procuring 
capabilities required by the future force to defeat future adversaries.  
¾ The FCS Brigade Combat Team (FBCT) is an ambitious effort developing 
holistic brigade sets of capabilities that will defeat any future threats.  FCS is the 
Army’s premiere modernization program that provides the country the required 
land force capabilities by replacing the Cold War armored vehicles with state of 
the art technologies.  FCS empowers Soldiers and Leaders with 14 manned and 
unmanned air and ground systems connected by a network.  
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¾ Many critics of the FCS Program, including the GAO, continue to view the FCS 
Program through a single system procurement prism that equates the program to a 
platform rather than a family of systems with an integrated network.   
The pamphlet goes to assert that reducing FCS funding would slow the delivery 
of much needed capability.  The FCS program has sustained multiple years of funding 
cuts, but the cumulative effects are taking a toll.  Consistent funding remains the key to 
delivering needed FCS capabilities to Soldiers.56     
Getting into further detail, the pamphlet responds to individual to points made in 
GAO Report GAO-08-408, Defense Acquisitions:  
¾ In response to the point that the knowledge gained on the FCS program is 
“commensurate with a program in early development” even though the program is 
more than halfway through its R&D phase, the Army states:  “The Army and the 
GAO disagree about what constitutes a sound business case for weapons systems 
acquisition programs.  In 2004, the Army restructured the program, largely based 
on GAO assessments and recommendations, to pursue a phased-development 
approach to the program.  The integration phases inherent in the revised approach 
were specifically designed to reduce program risk and concurrency, provide for 
more experimentation and systems’ verification, and principally to build 
knowledge not only on the progress of each developmental phase, but also to 
inform subsequent developmental phases.  GAO continues to assess risk using 
single system development metrics as benchmarks for assessing the FCS program.  
This approach does not give credit to the fact that verification of integration 
activities are occurring within each integration phase, which minimizes cost and 
risk later in the program.” 57 
¾ In response to the point that “FCS requirements are not yet fully defined and 
system designs are not yet complete,” the FCS Program office states:  “One of the 
key tenets of FCS from Concept Technology Demonstration was to accept the 
reality that FCS will continually refine requirements.  The GAO has a knowledge-
based model that is at odds with this type of acquisition, and FCS is being judged 
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against that yardstick, whether it applies or not.  FCS has deferred some 
requirements definition in order to use some of the initial test data for clarification 
and refinement.  The GAO assessment does not acknowledge the value of this 
approach, nor concede that this is a benefit from the decision to formalize the 
phased approach which will reduce risk.  Requirements will be refined in the 
Capability Development Document that will be published this year.”58 
¾ In response to the GAO observations that: “Forty-four critical technologies are 
approaching the basic maturity needed to start a program, but are immature for a 
program halfway through its scheduled development.  Most FCS technologies 
may not be fully mature until after 2009.”   The Army states that:  At this time, all 
critical technologies are maturing on schedule.  As of Mar 08, the Program 
Manager has assessed thirty-one (31) of the current 44 critical technologies as 
Technology Readiness Level 6; and, that the 13 remaining technologies will meet 
Technology Readiness Level 6 by Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in FY09.  
For all remaining Critical Technologies, risk mitigation plans to include 
Technology Readiness Level 6 events are scheduled and funded.  The Technology 
Integrated Product Team under the direction of the Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering will continue to monitor Critical Technology maturity.  59 
¾ In response to the GAO assessment that “FCS costs are likely to be higher than 
current Army estimate,” the Army states:  “The FBCT program employs an 
integrated cost containment strategy to ensure that life cycle costs are managed.  
While cost estimates from multiple agencies have differed, many times these 
differences stem from accounting for different elements inside and outside the 
program.  The Army’s cost estimates have been consistent and updated as the 
program added or removed systems.”60  
¾ Responding to GAO Report GAO-08-409, Defense Acquisitions:  Significant 
Challenges Ahead in Developing and Demonstrating FCS Network and Software, 
which states “Almost 5 years into the program, it is not yet clear if or when the 
information network that is at the heart of the FCS concept can be developed, 
built, and demonstrated by the Army and Lead System Integrator.” The Army 
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states “The FCS, System of Systems software strategy uses an incremental 
approach to software development allowing the program to more easily manage 
the content and integration of the FCS.  The program will do this by partitioning 
the extensive FCS software systems into smaller builds.  This incremental 
approach provides opportunities for the program to learn from each previous build 
and to apply what is learned to the subsequent builds.  As a result, FCS can adjust 
relatively quickly to changes in technology, changes in operational needs, or 
changes in priority.  The FCS incremental approach to software development 
reduces program risks by allowing Soldier input while the software is being 
developed.  As software increments are built, the Soldiers can begin evaluations 
and feedback on the increments.  The primary benefit to this approach is that 
Soldiers will get a final product that can be used as is; the Army will not have to 
make costly and time-consuming revisions.  This approach is a new way of doing 
business and offers many benefits for FCS and future programs.” 61  
¾ The GAO also makes the point that “Future Combat Systems software is about 
four times larger than the next two largest software-intensive defense programs.” 
The Army responds to this by stating:  “The FCS Program is being compared to 
individual systems like the Joint Strike Fighter (22.0M Equivalent Source Lines 
of Code) and Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (24.5M Equivalent Source Lines 
of Code).  This is not a fair comparison as Future Combat Systems delivers 
multiple integrated systems consisting of Manned Ground Vehicles, Unmanned 
Ground Vehicles, Unmanned Air Vehicles, Sensors, Network to include Battle 
Command, Training and Logistics.  In addition, the GAO cannot confirm that the 
data for the other systems, e.g., Joint Strike Fighter, includes operating system 
software and non-deployed simulation software as does the Future Combat 
Systems software estimate.  The overwhelming majority of the software required 
for FCS exists and comes from mature commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or 
government-off-the-shelf products.  Additionally, the Army employs small 
incremental software builds to greatly reduce the potential programmatic risks 
vice a high risk big bang approach.  While wary of the aggressive pace of the 
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program, the GAO acknowledged ‘the Army and LSI have implemented 
disciplined software practices for developing the network and software.’”62 
¾ In GAO-08-467SP, Defense Acquisitions:  Assessment of Selected Weapons 
Programs, the GAO states that “The Joint Strike Fighter and Future Combat 
Systems (FCS) are expected to be developed on a cost-reimbursable basis for 12 
years.  As of fiscal year 2007, DOD anticipates having to reimburse the prime 
contractors on these two programs nearly $13 billion more for their work 
activities than initially expected.  Eight development programs within the scope of 
our review that use cost-reimbursement type contracts have experienced or 
anticipate significant increases to initial contract prices.”  In response, the FCS 
Program Office states:  “GAO shows a Future Combat Systems contractor cost 
growth of 40%.  This is a correct statement if you consider the Future Combat 
Systems program at Milestone B consisted of 13+1 systems.  Since then, the 
Army increased from 13 to 18 systems.  This increased the contract value form 
$14M to $20M.  In the FY08-13 POM, the program returned back to 14+1 
systems.  This reduction was offset by additional network requirements, e.g., Joint 
Tactical Radios.  Thus, the GAO contractor cost growth is real due to contractor 
Statement of Work growth and program requirements growth.” 63  
The risks associated with the FCS program are immense.  But the reward is 
equally large.  One of the goals of FCS “is to let every soldier in the field get real-time 
reconnaissance imagery from any drone or human comrade who is in the network.” 64 At 
a recent test event, “the commander of the field-testing task force, COL Emmett Schaill 
remarked admiringly, “If I’d had that thing [FCS Micro Air Vehicle], I probably 
wouldn’t have gotten shot [in Iraq, where COL Schaill was wounded in an ambush].”  65 
“The technological challenge is immense.  A hundred different contractors are 
working on an estimated 95 million lines of computer code, four times as much as needed 
to operate other large weapon systems, such as the Air Force’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.  
Overall, the FCS involves some 44 ‘critical technologies;’  26 of those are directly related 
to the functioning of the network, and the Government Accountability Office rated only 
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two set of technologies ‘fully mature’ in March 2008.”   “But if—if—the Army can get 
the technology to work, it will give every single squad what [COL Emmitt] Schaill 
lacked on the day that he got shot:  the capability to receive pictures and … even video, 
across a high-speed mobile network.” 66 
B. PROGRAM AFFORDABILITY AND RELEVANCY TO PRESENT 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
1. Congressional Position 
The FCS program is living in an ever-changing national security environment 
which can easily alter the current course of the program.  It has experienced a few 
program restructurings since its program inception in 2003.  Some doubts have been 
raised, particularly from the Congress, on whether the original FCS concept, which it was 
designed to combat conventional land forces, is still working effectively in the “Long 
War” against terrorism, which features counterinsurgency and stabilization operations.  
According to the GAO report, the Army’s case for FCS relevancy in the present 
counterinsurgency operations at Iraq and Afghanistan might be overstated.  This is 
because the Army is placing undue emphasis on theoretical FCS capabilities, which were 
originally designed for excelling in conventional combat operation and have yet to be 
fully matured for fielding.  For instance, the Army argued that the FCS Mounted Combat 
System, a much lighter armored vehicle with more efficient fuel consumption, would 
achieve similar survivability as the heavily armored Abrams tank by avoiding the enemy 
rounds using the active protection system and by exploiting superior knowledge of enemy 
activities.  However, the threat in Iraq has come primarily in urban settings from 
individually launched weapons to Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).  Therefore, the 
ability to identify the attackers’ locations in these conditions may be beyond the 
technologies that are currently available in FCS.  Some Army officers who served in Iraq 
questioned the FCS relevancy in fighting this new kind of war.  Some suggested that the 
effective counterinsurgency operations are characterized by less of a function of superior 
technology and firepower but more of cultural awareness, interpersonal relationships, and 
security provided through human presence.67  
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Furthermore, there have been questions raised about FCS affordability and the 
legitimacy of the Army cost estimate on FCS against the higher cost estimates developed 
by the Department of Defense (i.e., CAIG) and the non-profit organization (i.e., IDA).  
According to Secretary of Defense Gates, the fundamental issue appears to be the overall 
affordability of the FCS program as it is currently structured.  He suggested to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee in February 2008 that the Department of Defense might not 
be able to afford to complete the FCS program.68            
Deployability:  Although a major impetus behind the FCS program was the Army 
leadership’s desire to make units equipped with armored vehicles easier to deploy 
overseas, the current plan to replace the Army’s armored vehicle fleet with FCS vehicles 
will not significantly reduce deployment time. Whether equipped with current-force or 
FCS components, the Army’s heavy units comprise hundreds of tracked vehicles and 
hundreds more trucks and trailers (see Table 2).  Deploying such units by air requires 
hundreds of aircraft sorties. Yet the lack of extensive paved surfaces for receiving and 
unloading aircraft at most airfields in the world (excluding large U.S. military facilities 
such as those in Germany and South Korea) limits the number of daily sorties by Air 
Force transport aircraft that those airfields can support.  For example, each C-17 transport 
plane can carry less than 0.3 percent of a brigade equipped with armored vehicles over 
long distances. As a result, limiting the number of aircraft sorties, in turn, limits the 
amount of equipment that can be delivered overseas in one day during the initial surge 
(the first 45 days) of a military operation to about 5 percent of a heavy brigade or 1 
percent of a heavy division.  After the first 45 days, even less cargo is likely to be 
delivered daily. CBO estimates that given those constraints, transporting a brigade 
equipped with the Army’s current armored vehicles overseas by air might take 23 days; 
moving an entire division similarly equipped might take more than four months (see 
Table 3).  In contrast, ships can easily transport very large amounts of the Army’s current 
equipment.  Indeed, one or two of the U.S. Military Sealift Command’s (MSC’s) large 
ships can transport an entire brigade’s worth of equipment, and eight of those vessels can 
transport an entire division overseas.  Most coastal regions of the world have at least one 
large port capable of receiving MSC’s ships.  And even though some of the equipment 
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associated with a heavy division might have to be loaded onto some of the command’s 
slower ships, it would still take far less time to deliver a full heavy division by sea—27 
days—than it would take by air.  Replacing the Army’s current armored vehicles with 
FCS vehicles does not tip the balance in favor of airlifting those systems.  In fact, it 
makes very little difference.  To transport an FCS brigade by air using C-17 aircraft 
would require 340 to 380 sorties—a process that would take 19 or 20 days—to any 
overseas destination without an extremely large airport (see Table 3).  That compares 
with the roughly 410 sorties needed to move a heavy brigade equipped with current 
systems.  Thus, replacing the Army’s current fleet of tracked vehicles with FCS 
components would yield, at most, a 17 percent reduction in the airlift sorties (and time) 
needed to deploy a heavy brigade-sized unit overseas. Because brigade-sized units are 
rarely deployed alone, however, it is useful to examine the time needed to deploy larger 
formations, such as divisions.  A division equipped with FCS vehicles could weigh 
roughly 20 percent less than a heavy division equipped with current armored vehicles—
95,000 tons compared with 120,000 tons. Even so, transporting such a division overseas 
by air would take at least 115 days.  Transport by sea could be accomplished solely by 
the MSC’s fastest sealift ships and would require 23 days rather than the 27 days needed 
to transport a similar division equipped with current vehicles (see Table 8). 69 
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Table 8.   Time Needed to Deploy Equipment to East Africa 
2. Army Position 
The Army is currently exploring options to accelerate the FCS program, in part 
due to congressional concerns over current readiness and the availability of future 
program funds.  The Congress has suggested that the Army should be more aggressive in 
inserting FCS technologies into the Army’s current fleet of vehicles, eliminating some 
FCS systems, and completing the FCS program in four to five years.  Preparations are 
underway for the first “Spin Out” of FCS capabilities to units in the field.  The Army 
Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at Fort Bliss, Texas, is currently assessing these Spin Out 
technologies in the field environment prior to full deployment to the units.70  
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Army Secretary, Pete Geren, has indicated that he expects the service will 
continue to make changes to Future Combat Systems, the cornerstone of its 
modernization efforts, to better position the Army to counter changing threats.  Speaking 
at the Association of the United States Army's annual meeting, Geren said the Army's 
current plans for the program are a "good way ahead now."  But any long-term 
transformation program such as FCS is "going to evolve as the threat evolves," the 
former Texas House member said. "That is the nature of the beast."71   
In June 2008, the Army announced that it would focus on fielding FCS first to 
infantry brigades, marking a major departure from initial plans that called for sending the 
first batch of war-fighting technologies to heavy units.  Infantry brigades, which have 
been used heavily in Iraq and Afghanistan, will begin receiving pieces of FCS in 2011—
three years earlier than planned.  FCS is a system of manned and unmanned air and 
ground vehicles tied together by a complex electronic network.72  
Both Geren and Army Chief of Staff, George Casey, emphasized that the Army 
remains committed to the FCS program, the largest and most expensive development 
program in the service's history.  FCS has been met with some criticism on Capitol Hill, 
particularly within the House, where several key lawmakers have raised concerns about 
the cost and feasibility of the program.73  
But it appears that the Army's recent changes to the program, especially its focus 
on infantry brigades, have helped assuage some congressional concerns.  In September 
2008, Congress approved a spending bill that increases the Pentagon's $3.6 billion 
request for FCS by $26 million, marking the first time in years the program's budget has 
not been trimmed. 74   
Meanwhile, the Army is evaluating its legacy force, with leaders now in 
discussions over how to handle a fleet of tanks and other vehicles that have been in 
service for decades.  Casey said one of the toughest decisions before the Army is to 
decide when it should stop updating its older systems.  The goal, Casey said, is to build a 
force that is affordable and able to counter the asymmetric threat posed by terrorists and 
insurgencies.75 
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Any move to prioritize the Army's future programs over its current fleet could run 
into stiff opposition on Capitol Hill.  Recently, Democratic and Republican leaders of the 
House Armed Services Committee expressed concerns about any efforts to divert funding 
for older systems, such as the Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, to pay for 
FCS.76   
"We feel that reducing investments in these programs, which constitute the core 
of the Army's armored combat vehicle fleet, before the Army even begins to test realistic 
prototypes of FCS vehicles in the 2012-2015 timeframe, could place our future forces at 
risk if achieving the FCS program's aggressive schedule is delayed, or FCS manned 
vehicles cost more than is now forecast," they wrote in a letter to Defense Secretary 
Gates. 77 
The Department of Defense clearly showed its support for the FCS approach in a 
July 2008 report from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (USD AT&L).  The report, which was written by a Defense Science Board 
Task Force led by Dr. Jacques Gansler, states that the: “DoD will need to accelerate the 
acquisition of net-centric systems–of –systems, and other next generation equipment, that 
anticipates the evolution of asymmetric warfare, so that the nation will have the needed 
21st Century military force structure and capabilities…  DoD also needs to modify its 
acquisition efforts to focus on information-based warfare….  R&D investments will need 
to shift to net-centric relevant architectures, software and Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
systems which must be optimized for performance and cost as ‘systems-of-systems.’”78  
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L report goes on to remove 
any doubt that the specific approach and implementation of the FCS program is not only 
something that it approves of, but something that it wants other programs to model 
themselves on, when it states: “A government systems architecture/engineering manager 
on each major program should be required.  Experienced government program 
management and systems engineering oversight capability on systems-of-systems should 
become the norm (e.g., Future Combat System (FCS)).”79   
 42
In a large organization, such as the U.S. Government, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that opinions run both ways.  In response to the USD AT&L report, Philip Coyle, senior 
adviser with the Center for Defense Information, a security policy research organization 
in Washington, agreed with the systems-of-systems strategy, but disagreed with their 
choice of the Future Combat Systems program as a model, saying:  “It’s not a good 
example, as FCS is way over budget and way behind schedule.”  Coyle, who served as 
assistant secretary of Defense and director of Defense’s Operational Test and Evaluation 
Directorate from 1994 to 2001, said the department should not try to integrate too many 
disparate functions into one system.  For example, a household system of systems linking 
an alarm clock with a microwave oven and phone lines could be cobbled together, he 
said, but if the goal merely was to make cooking breakfast easier, then that approach 
would be too complicated.80   
One problem with the CBO Study on FCS Program Alternatives is that it appears 
to assess the new FCS vehicles as if they are simply equipment replacements for the 
current fleet of vehicles.  What this does not take into account is that the Army expects 
the new vehicles to provide a quantum leap forward in capability.  Army Vice Chief of 
Staff, Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, stated recently that the FCS Manned Ground Vehicle "is a 
platform designed for the full-spectrum fight.  The self-sufficient nature of the system has 
a vast array of networked capabilities that will literally change the game in favor of the 
Soldier."  One misperception, according to the general, is that the FCS vehicles are 
simply new tanks. But since the Army already has the most powerful and effective tanks 
in the world, people are skeptical that the Army requires new FCS vehicles.  Chiarelli 
harkened back to history to explain that not all tanks are equal; and he looked to the 
future to explain that something more than tanks are required if U.S. Soldiers are to 
"dominate, not survive, in a full-spectrum operating environment."81  So replacing the old 
vehicles is not an apples-to-apples replacement.  The intent of the FCS Program is that 
this will be more like replacing a World War II fighter plane with a modern jet.   
While critics of the FCS program point to its high cost, FCS is the only Army 
program among the top 15 Pentagon weapons acquisition programs and currently  
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accounts for only 3.7% of the total Army budget.  In the long term, FCS could save 
billions of dollars in maintenance, fuel, and personnel costs while reducing the number of 
troops in harm's way:  
• The MGV design will enable crews to perform substantially more maintenance, 
reducing the required number of mechanics by half.   
• The hybrid electric engine in FCS vehicles will consume up to 30% less fuel 
than current vehicles consume.  Fuel is currently a major Army cost driver.  In 
addition, reducing the number of required supply convoys would reduce 
manpower and casualties in what are widely acknowledged as some of the most 
vulnerable US forces in Iraq.   
• Manpower costs are by far the Army's largest expense, accounting for 36% of 
the Service's 2008 budget.  In addition to needing fewer mechanics and truck 
drivers, FCS brigades will require 500 fewer soldiers than today's heavy 
brigades because of other FCS efficiencies.82  
C. PROGRAM OPTIONS & ALTERNATIVES 
1. Congressional Position 
According to the GAO, one of the main issues is the misalignment of the FCS 
program’s normal progress with the key events used to manage and make decisions, in 
which key decisions are made well before sufficient knowledge is available.  The next 
key milestone decision will occur in 2009 and the key knowledge must be attained to 
determine whether FCS capabilities have been demonstrated to be both technically 
feasible and militarily worthwhile.  Otherwise, the DoD and the Army will need to have 
viable alternatives to fielding the FCS capability as currently envisioned, to include 
determining how to structure the remainder of the FCS program so that is attains high 
level of knowledge before key commitments.  For instance, an alternative need not 
represent a choice between FCS and the current force, but could include fielding a subset 
of FCS, such as a class of vehicles, if they perform as needed and provide a militarily 
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worthwhile capability.  The other aspect of the FCS program that warrants attention and 
should not wait until the 2009 decision is the Army decision to contract with the LSI for 
early production of FCS spin outs, the NLOS-C vehicles, and the low rate production for 
the core FCS program.  GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense to closely 
examine the oversight implications and take steps to mitigate the risks to include full 
range of alternatives for contracting for production.  Furthermore, regarding the FCS 
network and software development and demonstration efforts, GAO recommends that the 
Secretary of Defense to direct the FCS program to stabilize network and software 
requirements with a clear set of criteria for acceptable network performance, to 
synchronize the network development and demonstration with other FCS elements, and 
to conciliate the differences between independent and Army estimates of network and 
software development scope and cost.83         
If the reports from the GAO and CBO were only suggestions for improvement, 
they could be taken at their face value and used to the best practicable extent by the FCS 
Program Office.  But they certainly seemed to cut deeper than that, suggesting 
mismanagement of the program and implying to Congress that serious oversight steps 
should be taken.  This negative campaign has had its deleterious effects, as evidenced by 
comments from Congress including the following: “This thing gets more bizarre by the 
day,’ fumed Rep. Neil Abercrombie, D-Hawaii, who chairs the House Armed Services 
subcommittee that oversees the FCS.  ‘They’re delaying the test by a year—how the hell 
is that an acceleration?’”84  This kind of public commentary is the starting position 
political backdrop that the Army is going to have to try to turn around.   
2. DoD & Army Position 
The Army has adopted a flexible approach to the development and deployment of 
FCS.  Repeatedly, adjustments have been made to account for the changing national 
security picture.   For example, “In June [2008], the Army announced the latest 




heavy armored units, the program would now focus on equipping the light infantry, 
which has suffered the worst casualties in Iraq.  Military officials touted this restructuring 
as an ‘acceleration.’”85  
This flexible approach appears to be the cornerstone of the Army’s program 
management approach.  The Army continues to manage the project under the basic credo 
that “only an all-in-one “system-of-systems” approach can ensure that all the individual 
gadgets work together.”  However, they have become more open to responding to the 
very real operational and political pressures that are part and parcel to managing a large, 
high-profile program:  “Meanwhile, under congressional pressure to show near-term 
results, the Army has committed to fielding individual elements of the FCS piecemeal as 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Systems of systems (SOS) present some unusual analysis challenges that often are 
not explicitly addressed, yet can impact the resulting degree of system effectiveness.  
Potential risks associated with integrating a diverse set of systems and associated 
hardware/hardware, hardware/software, and software/software often exist.  These are 
made all the more difficult by individual systems at different levels of maturity and 
potential risks that do not exist at the individual system level.  Established risk 
management processes/analysis may be in place for different systems, yet process steps 
and associated tools and techniques may not be compatible.  Therefore, as we have seen 
from the previous sections, the reality of the situation for FCS is very much a matter of 
perspective.  In order to assess the best course for the future of FCS, it is critical that we 
do it from several perspectives.  As we examine the situation with FCS, we must consider 
both sides (i.e., proponent and opponent) of the stories and weigh them against each issue 
that the FCS faces and then propose the best course of action.  The final course of action 
may consist of the right combination of more than one alternative in order to achieve 
success for FCS.    
A. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
The purpose of the analysis of alternatives is to analyze possible courses of 
actions identified in the data section, above, for dealing with all FCS issues and risks.  
However, our analysis of alternatives will focus only on the key FCS issues.  This is 
because there is always the constraint of how much resources are available for execution.  
Each of the issues or risks will be examined from both the positions of each of the 
various proponents and opponents.  Consequently, based on our rationales, we will 
determine a set of course of actions that address all key issues and risks.   
In the big picture, our recommended approach for the Army in dealing with areas 
where conflicts do exist between the Congressional position and the current Army 
position is to: 
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1. Do the Right Thing.  That is, do not compromise on anything that is 
critical to the Army’s mission or the survivability of soldiers. 
2. Take a Fresh Look.  FCS has done a good job of adapting and needs to 
continue doing so.  Sometimes, good ideas come from outside an 
organization and the analyses from the CBO, GAO, CRS, etc., are full of 
great ideas.  Our recommendation here is that it is critical to take the time 
to carefully consider their recommendations with an open mind so as to be 
able to assess them based on their merit.   
3. Separate the Wheat from the Chaff.  The Army can not make everyone 
happy on every issue.  After careful examination of all the ideas, choose 
those that will truly help and get rid of the rest.  That said, choose your 
fights carefully.  Where there are choices that work well either way, 
choose the positions that Congress has indicated that they support.   
4. Market the Plan.  It is critical that people understand the plusses that FCS 
is bringing to the table in more concrete terms.  As discussed in the last 
section, FCS is operating in the Political Decision Making Model, so it 
does not get to unilaterally choose its best course of action.  Rather, it 
must work with the various stakeholders in order to garner support and 
consensus.  An important factor in achieving and maintaining consensus is 
our ability to present positive data on the groundbreaking ways that FCS 
will transform and support the force.  Data on important points such as the 
long term savings in fuel costs must be presented clearly and repeatedly to 
decision makers to improve the face of the FCS program.  Right now, 
most of the press, data and analyses focus on FCS being expensive.  This 
desperately needs to be turned around by providing concrete and simple 
information on the benefits of FCS.  The Army has to accept the job of 
marketing FCS as something more than a collateral duty if it wishes this 
program to achieve its full potential. 
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5. Implement the Plan.  Given all the above, implementation may seem the 
easiest part of bringing FCS to fruition.  It is important, nonetheless, to 
continue to be flexible and pro-active.  That is, the program office should 
understand that the changing requirements of the national security 
environment, technology development, etc., will drive changes to the 
program in the future.  It is important that the FCS Program Office 
continue to work with the stake-holders to react effectively to these 
changes while not overreacting.   
Issue 1:  The Lead System Integrator (LSI)  
We agree with the GAO that the Sectary of Defense should examine the FCS LSI 
oversight implications and the Army’s decision to contract with the LSI for early 
production of FCS spin outs to include both NLOS-C vehicles and the low rate 
production for core FCS program.  The original Army intent and usage for LSI was to 
take on the most challenging tasks of FCS complex system integration beyond what the 
Army can handle at the time for System Development and Demonstration Phase, in 
hoping to bring the best innovative minds from the industries while obtaining the best 
effort by making it profitable.  By leaving too much program oversight to a LSI, the 
Army workforce will gradually lose most of its workforce’s program management core 
competency and eventually yield most of the program oversight control to the hand of the 
LSI.  Consequently, Congress has passed the FY 2009 Defense Authorization Bill 
Markup that prohibits DoD agencies from awarding new contracts for LSI functions in 
the acquisition of major systems.  This is also partly due to the recent concerns of the 
DoD acquisition workforce skill erosion in System of System (SoS) program 
management.  In order to ride out this storm for the long term, we recommend setting up 
a Future Combat Systems Integration office to replace the current FCS management 
structure, in particular, the LSI.   
When FCS was first created, a major consideration was push-back and inertia 
from the existing Army.  Transformational change (Kaikaku) is something that often 
requires a major break from the past in order to enact.  The alternative of focusing on 
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small incremental changes (Kaizen) can result in arguments about each small change and, 
in the end, stifle the overall intent.  It appears that, at the outset, the FCS program office 
took some drastic steps in order to side-step this inertia of “not the way we do things 
around here.”  Specifically, the FCS program office pointedly set itself completely apart 
from the rest of the Army, which it labeled “the legacy force.”  FCS went so far as to 
forgo traditional unit organization such as Brigades, Divisions, and Corps.  Instead it 
identified new titles:  The Unit of Action (UA) and the Unit of Employment (UE).  This 
step was presumably taken in order to provide the FCS architects with more flexibility to 
design the overall system as they saw fit.  Similarly, we believe that one of the underlying 
reasons for adopting an LSI was to bring in people who specifically were not tied to the 
status quo.  Time has passed now and the original purposes of some of the devices 
created in the genesis of FCS are no longer needed.  The terms UA and UE served their 
purposes for awhile but have now been dismissed, as FCS has returned to the traditional 
nomenclature of Brigades, Divisions, and Corps.  Similarly, we believe that the LSI 
served its purpose in breaking the logjam of inertia against transformational change.  But 
with the transformational changes now underway with their own measure of momentum, 
the concept of the LSI needs to be examined under a different light:  Its plusses and 
minuses based on simple merit.  Here, our basic contention is that it is in the Army’s best 
interest to run its own program versus trusting a commercial corporation to do it for them.  
Given our analysis, the existence of the LSI, working as a second layer of management 
virtually in parallel with the FCS program office, adds unnecessarily to the overall cost 
and complexity of the program.     
Similarly, our analysis indicates that the overall idea of maintaining FCS as a 
program unto itself and separate from the rest of the Army is an idea that has lost its 
raison d'être.  Already, the FCS program office has taken a number of incremental steps 
of handing responsibilities back to Army project offices.  Our analysis indicates that it is 
time to take the much larger step of handing development responsibility for all the 




overall architect and the LSI would cease to exist (though we anticipate that the 
companies involved would continue to support the Army in a more traditional advisory 
role).    
Issue 2:  Performance metrics/ approaches for System of System Procurement 
The Army and the GAO disagree on what constitutes a sound business case for 
major weapon system acquisition programs.  The Army FCS program office argued that 
GAO continues to assess FCS performance and risk through a single system procurement 
prism, equating to a single platform, rather than a family of systems within an integrated 
network.  Our analysis leads us to agree partially with the Army in that it has restructured 
the FCS program in 2004 based on GAO recommendation to pursue a phased-
development approach.  This approach is supported by our findings and analysis because 
it is specifically designed for tackling a System of System procurement, in order to 
reduce risk and concurrency, provide for more experimentation and systems’ verification, 
and principally to build knowledge not only on the progress of each developmental phase, 
but to inform subsequent developmental phases.  Our analysis partially disagrees with 
GAO in that the FCS requirements are not yet fully defined and system designs are not 
yet complete, in which the GAO uses a knowledge-based model that is at odds with this 
type of acquisition.  We agree with the Army that the phased approach allows FCS to 
defer some requirements definition in order to use some of the initial test data for 
clarification and refinement.  Unlike the single system procurement, the System of 
Systems software strategy uses an incremental approach to software development, 
allowing the program to more easily manage the content and integration of the FCS.  As a 
result, FCS can adjust relatively quickly to changes in technology, changes in operational 
needs, or changes in priority.  As software increments are built, the Soldiers can begin 
evaluations and feedback on the increments.  The primary benefit to this approach is that 
Soldiers will get militarily useful increments that can be used as is.  This approach is a 
new way of doing business and offers many benefits for FCS and future programs. 
However, our analysis does not support the Army position that only the all-in-one 
“system of systems” approach can ensure that all the individual components work 
together.    Yet, ironically, the majority of the electronic communications capabilities 
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essential to linking the different FCS components are being developed outside the 
program by three other independent programs.  Meanwhile, under Congressional pressure 
to show near-term results, the Army has committed to fielding individual elements of the 
FCS piecemeal as each technology matures.  We agree that the system of system strategy 
should use a phase increment approach, but should not try to integrate too many disparate 
functions into one system.  Otherwise, the approach would become overly complex and 
problematic to manage.  Our findings agree with the GAO that the next key milestone 
decision will occur in 2009 and the key knowledge must be attained to determine whether 
FCS capabilities have been demonstrated to be both technically feasible and militarily 
worthwhile.  Otherwise, the DoD and the Army will need to have viable alternatives to 
fielding the FCS capability as currently envisioned, to include determining how to 
structure the remainder of the FCS program so that is attains high level of knowledge 
before key commitments.  For instance, an alternative need not represent a choice 
between FCS and the current force, but could include fielding a subset of FCS, such as a 
class of vehicles, if they perform as needed and provide a militarily worthwhile 
capability.    Furthermore, regarding the FCS network and software development and 
demonstration efforts, our analysis supports the GAO recommendation that the Secretary 
of Defense to direct the FCS program to stabilize network and software requirements 
with a clear set of criteria for acceptable network performance, to synchronize the 
network development and demonstration with other FCS elements, and to conciliate the 
differences between independent and Army estimates of network and software 
development scope and cost.   
Issue 3:  FCS Cost & Affordability 
Due to the wide variations in FCS cost estimates since program inception, we 
agree that there has been lack of confidence by many government officials that the FCS 
program can be completed within cost.  The current Army cost estimate of $160.9 billion 
is largely unchanged from the last year’s estimate, despite the major program 
restructuring that reduced the number of systems from 18 to 14.  However, the four 
additional systems are still needed:  Three are just being developed and deployed by other 
Army programs using other Army money (Class II UAV, Class III UAV and Intelligent 
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Munition System), while the fourth (Armed Robotic Vehicle) is being deferred.  This 
adds fuel to the Congressional fire as it appears that the Army is playing a shell game:  
Saying that they can keep the cost of FCS constant, but then shuffling costs to other 
programs in order to be able to maintain this pledge.  Our analysis agrees with Secretary 
of Defense Gates that the fundamental issue appears to be the overall affordability of the 
FCS program as it is currently structured.  We all know that the Department of Defense 
might not be able to afford to complete the FCS program due to the near-term and future 
national fiscal policies and in a time of fading global economy.  Consequently, we like 
the recent Army decision for exploring options to accelerate the FCS program, in part due 
to congressional concerns over current readiness and the availability of future program 
funds.  The Congress has suggested that the Army should be more aggressive in inserting 
FCS technologies into the Army’s current fleet of vehicles, eliminating some FCS 
systems, and completing the FCS program in four to five years.  Preparations are 
underway for the first “Spin Out” of FCS capabilities to units in the field.  The Army 
Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at Fort Bliss, Texas, is currently assessing these Spin Out 
technologies in the field environment prior to full deployment to the units.  In summary, 
we like this piecemeal approach in order to reduce overall program cost while warfighter 
still reaps the benefits in the near term before waiting for the full FCS development 
completion.                     
Issue 4:  Reassess FCS capabilities to present national security 
The greatest single driver in continuing analysis of the FCS program is changing 
national security environment.  The huge expense of the current commitments in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the nature of the threats being encountered there have caused many in 
Congress and the Army to question the existence and priorities of the FCS program. 
Since its inception in 2003, FCS has undergone at least one major program 
restructure.  We agree partially with the GAO analysis that questions whether the original 
FCS concept, which was designed to combat conventional land forces, is still valid in the 
“Long War” against terrorism with its counterinsurgency and stabilization operations.  
For instance, the Army has argued that the FCS Mounted Combat System, a much lighter 
armored vehicle, would provide survivability similar to that provided by the heavily 
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armored Abrams tank.  The theory goes that the MCS would avoid being hit by 
exploiting superior knowledge of enemy activities with the Active Protection System 
providing an effective backup.  However, the threats in Iraq have come primarily in urban 
settings from individually launched Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IED).  As the GAO has pointed out, our ability to identify the 
attackers’ locations in these conditions may be beyond the technologies that are currently 
available in FCS.  In addition, we believe that the Active Protection System may not be 
usable in an urban setting.  APS uses explosions to detonate weapons before they can hit 
the tank.  But these explosions can kill friendly dismounted soldiers and civilians, so 
activation of the APS will have to be limited to very specific conditions, which will 
greatly curtail its utility.   
We do understand that FCS is the Army’s cornerstone of its long term 
modernization efforts to replace majority of its aging Army armored combat vehicle fleet.  
However, we believe that the FCS must look at both the long term and the near term 
requirements and restructure itself accordingly to spin out FCS systems that will 
primarily focus on current warfighter needs.  Consequently, Army Secretary Pete Geren 
has indicated that he expects the service will continue to make changes to Future Combat 
Systems, the cornerstone of its modernization efforts, to better position the Army to 
counter changing threats.  In June 2008, the Army announced that it would focus on 
fielding FCS first to infantry brigades, marking a major departure from initial plans that 
called for sending the first batch of war-fighting technologies to heavy units.  Infantry 
brigades, which have been used heavily in Iraq and Afghanistan, will begin receiving 
pieces of FCS in 2011-- three years earlier than planned.  This also has helped assuage 
some congressional concerns on how FCS capabilities will be fielded to current 
warfighters.  In the meantime, we feel that the Army must also find the right balance and 
the right mix of investment on both the legacy systems prior to them being phasing out 
and the FCS systems while still maintaining the current warfighting capability to counter 
the current asymmetric threats.  The Army is currently evaluating its legacy force, with 
leaders now in discussions over how to handle a fleet of tanks and other vehicles that has 
been in service for decades.  General Casey said one of the toughest decisions before the 
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Army is to decide when it should stop updating its older systems. The goal, General 
Casey said, is to build a force that is affordable and able to counter the asymmetric threat 
posed by terrorists and insurgencies.  However, the Army and the Congress are currently 
struggling with prioritizing all Army programs with limited budget to go around.  
Therefore, any move to prioritize the Army's future programs over its current fleet could 
run into stiff opposition on Capitol Hill.  Both Democratic and Republican leaders of the 
House Armed Services Committee expressed concerns about any efforts to divert funding 
for older systems, such as the Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, to pay for FCS.  
On the other hand, FCS equipments such as the Unattended Ground Sensors, Small 
Unmanned Ground Vehicles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Class I (i.e., Micro Air Vehicle), 
and the FCS networking suite, should be fielded as soon as possible as they can help to 
save lives in Afghanistan and Iraq by providing access to real-time reconnaissance 
imagery and data.   
In summary, we have critically analyzed FCS key acquisition tenets and proposed 
a plan that will refocus FCS on current warfighter needs, while delaying development of 
vehicles that are less critical in the short-term and still providing funding for long-term 
Army modernization.  The details are discussed in the next section but will include the 
following for near term priorities in fielding IBCTs for OIF/OEF: 
• Defer all MGV developments except for the NLOS-C 
• Kill the development of UAV class IV 
• Continue to fund the FCS Network efforts and the Soldier Systems 
• Cease development of the NLOS LS 
• Continue work on UGS 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The FCS program was designed to provide leap-ahead technology to the Army in 
a fully integrated fashion.  However, the endeavor has proven to be much more 
complicated and expensive than originally envisioned.  As a result, the Army has been 
facing enormous pressure from Congress to cancel or restructure the FCS program.   
Since the program’s inception, the war in Iraq has dramatically changed the 
playing field:  Fighting irregular forces in urban environments is completely different 
than fighting a conventional engagement.  In addition, the idea of using a commercial 
contractor to oversee government development—the lead systems integrator (LSI) 
concept—has fallen out of vogue, as many lawmakers now see it as “leaving the fox in 
charge of the henhouse.”  In the face of these pressures, the Army has remained flexible, 
trying to meet the demands of many of its detractors by making multiple changes to the 
program.  But our analysis indicates that this formula will not work and will likely lead to 
the cancellation or evisceration of this groundbreaking program.   
The Army leadership is starting to appear as the proverbial Dutch boy with too 
few fingers to stop all the leaks that are springing in the dyke.  By trying to respond to the 
many pressures and do so without raising their cost estimates, the Army is beginning to 
lose its credibility.  Some specific recent actions by the Army include: 
• Planning to deploy equipment (the NLOS cannon) before it is ready so 
that it can appease some of its detractors 
• Reducing the number of platforms from 18 to 14 so that it can control its 
spiraling costs  
• Keeping their cost estimate for the program pinned at $161 Billion even 
though estimates from independent groups (CAIG and IDA) show costs 
growing to as high as $233 Billion  
• Acknowledging that its own estimate for the number of required software 
lines of code has grown by 50%, but then insisting that costs will not grow 
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These actions smack of desperation and send the message to Congress that, rather 
than managing the program in a pro-active and upfront manner, the Army has chosen to 
defend their current course of action, regardless of mounting evidence or pressures. 
We therefore conclude that it is time for the Army to conduct a major program 
restructuring in order to protect the concept of a long-term modernization program that 
can steer the development and integration of new systems into the Army. 
In particular, we recommend that the Army create a Future Combat Systems 
Integration (FCSI) office.  This Army-managed and staffed office would be charged with 
planning for the integration of new systems into the panoply of Army systems.  This 
office would replace the current FCS management structure and, in particular, the LSI.   
Rather than trying to plan everything the Army needs or wants in a single stroke 
of genius, as was attempted in 2000, the FCSI office will: 
• Work on the incremental improvement of the Army by identifying the 
systems that are needed in the short term.  The FCSI office would work 
with the Army Material Command (AMC) to ensure that these systems 
receive appropriate prioritization and funding in the POM 
• Development of individual systems would be managed by Army Program 
Managers, as is traditionally done.  However, the FCSI office would be 
intimately involved in the initial engineering to ensure that the system 
would fit properly into the System of Systems.  In addition, the FCSI 
office would serve as a member of the Integrated Product Team (IPT) for 
each new or improved system, and would support test and integration 
efforts 
The writing is on the wall that the Army will not be able to afford to focus on both 
its needs in Iraq and Afghanistan and its long-term vision of the future as if they were 
largely separate entities.  Our recommendations would help to bring these two views back 
into a single focused vision in which the Army develops the items it needs now while 
working to integrate each new development into this single cohesive force where the 
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interoperability of each item has been considered and planned for from the start by an 
office that is specifically charged with this function.   
In terms of short term priorities, we recommend that the new FCSI office: 
1. Halt development of all the new FCS vehicles except for the NLOS 
Cannon.  In general, the current generation of Army vehicles is doing the 
job in Iraq, as exemplified by the M1A2 and the Bradley.  Combat 
conditions have forced the Army to take steps to improve or replace other 
vehicles, resulting in the up-armored HMWWV and the MRAP.  There is 
no current FCS equivalent to these new vehicles.  Nonetheless, as we look 
at long term equipping requirements for the Army, we do recognize a need 
to eventually field some of the advantageous new technologies that are 
being developed for FCS, including improved fuel efficiency, improved 
common logistics, and the new Active Protection System which is 
designed to protect the vehicles against incoming missiles and Rocket 
Propelled Grenades (RPGs).  Therefore, it is our recommendation that the 
Army should proceed with a single prototype new vehicle.  We are 
recommending the NLOS-Cannon as the best fit for two reasons:  firstly, 
the M-109 Self Propelled Artillery (which NLOS-C is replacing) is the 
oldest vehicle in the current inventory; secondly, self propelled artillery is 
a stand-off weapon that will not be called on to fight in the streets of urban 
areas, so the immaturity of the Close In Protection System designed to 
protect FCS vehicles from RPGs and missiles will be less of a factor.  The 
primary plusses for this recommendation are a short-term reduction in cost 
and a change to an incremental development strategy wherein 
development of future vehicles would benefit from lessons learned during 
the development of the prototype NLOS-C.   Detailed management of this 
effort should be handed off to PM AFV.   
2. Halt the development of the Class IV UAV while continuing the 
development of the Class I UAV.  The Army currently has multiple UAVs 
of various sizes in development and production.  All requirements for new 
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UAVs should be worked through PM UAV as would traditionally be done.  
PM FCSI would be charged with ensuring that current and new platforms 
are designed with a view toward holistic Army requirements and 
integrated communications.  It will be significantly less expensive to 
modify the existing and emergent UAVs than develop the planned new 
FCS-specific UAVs.  That said, the Class I UAV (the smallest UAV, 
which is deployable by a single soldier) provides a unique capability that 
none of the other services or UAVs offer and it can provide immediate 
assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
3. Continue to fund FCS network efforts.  This area has the potential to 
provide a true asymmetric advantage over enemy forces, taking an area 
that is already a strength for US forces and improving it by another order 
of magnitude 
4. Halt development of the NLOS Launch System.  The Guided Multiple 
Launch Rocket System (G-MLRS) is a proven weapon system with 
virtually the same capability.   
5. Continue work on Unattended Ground Systems, but hand detailed 
management of this effort over to the PM for Remote Unmanned Sensor 
Systems (PM RUSS). 
6. Continue the development of the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
(SUGV), but delay further work on the MULE.  Development of the 
SUGV is fairly mature and can have immediate impact on current 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Conversely, the MULE is neither 
ready nor is there an urgent need for the capabilities that it will bring to 
the battlefield.  As with our other recommendations, we believe that the 
detailed development work should be handed off to an Army PM, in this 
case the PM for Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV).    
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VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The FCS program is an ambitious and far-reaching effort to modernize the Army 
with “leap ahead” technology that is designed to optimize the integration of the entire 
“system of systems.”  This paper has provided a very high level overview of the program, 
taking a cursory look at some of the positions espoused by Congress, the Department of 
Defense, and the Army regarding the benefits and risks of this far-reaching program.  
Future research could look into any of the many specific areas within FCS or take a more 
in-depth look at the whole.  In addition, each year brings with it great changes to the 
landscape within which any analysis is performed.  For example, when we started writing 
this paper, the situation in Iraq was still very volatile, the situation in Afghanistan 
appeared to be under control, and George W. Bush was President.  Over the course of the 
year that we spent on this paper, these three situations have changed dramatically, with 
the insurgence in Iraq quieting down significantly, that in Afghanistan heating up, and 
Barack Obama winning the Oval Office.  So, simply revisiting the overall FCS program 
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